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p ARTNERSHIPS-SALE OF GOODWILL-RIGHT OF RETIRING p ARTNER TO
EJECT PARTNERSHIP FROM LEASED PREMISES-Plaintiff, owning a one-third
interest in a partnership, sold his interest to the other partners, among them the
defendant. Included in the sale was the goodwill of the partnership. The reversion
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in the property leased by the partnership was subsequently acquired by plaintiff,
who notified defendant to vacate the premises upon termination of the lease.
Defendant refused, and plaintiff brought a forcible entry and detainer action,
recovering judgment in the trial court. On appeal, held, affirmed. Stone v. Lerner,
(Colo. 1948) 195 P. (2d) 964.
The rule is generally accepted that after its sale goodwill must not be impaired
by an act of the vendor.1 Courts have held that goodwill may attach to land,2
an enterprise,3 or a business name.4 Goodwill attaching to land inures to the benefit
of the owner,5 or of the lessee where the land has been leased;6 when the lease
expires, the goodwill passes to the lessor. 7 This analysis would explain the decision
in the principal case, for defendant would have lost his interest in the goodwill
when the lease expired and could not have been injured by plaintiff's action.
Goodwill may also adhere to a business.8 So, where a vendor of a milk route
and its goodwill,9 or a vendor of a newspaper route and its goodwill,1° took another
route covering the same territory, the courts held that he could not by such means
take away that which he had sold. In these and similar cases, where the seller has
derogated from his grant by going into a competing business, the courts disagree
as to how much freedom to compete he should have.11 These decisions are of
limited significance in the present case, however, for here the vendor was not
competing, nor was there any indication that he intended to set up a similar
business on the premises. 12 Although a tenant may be considered to have an
1

Foreman, "Conflicting Theories of Good Will," 22 CoL. L. REv. 638 (1922).
Cruttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. Jun. 334, 34 Eng. Rep. 129 (1810). Chittenden v.
Witbeck, 50 Mich. 401, 15 N.W. 526 (1883).
8
Chittenden v. Witbeck, 50 Mich. 401, 15 N.W. 526 (1883). People ex rel.
A. J. Johnson Co. v. Roberts, 1·59 N.Y. 70, 53 N.E. 685 (1899); Pollock v. Ralston,
5 Wash. (2d) 36, 104 P. (2d) 934 (1940).
4
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 975.
5
Wright, "The Nature and Basis of Legal Goodwill," 24 ILL. L. REv. 20 at 33
(1929); "In many instances the so-called 'goodwill return' is no more than pure site
rent. There arises an unearned differential advantage attaching to the land and inuring
to the benefit of the owner of the land. It was this fact which often led the courts to
refer to goodwill as attaching to the land, premises, or location. This was the basis for the
earliest goodwill concept..•• Where by habit or custom the customers 'resort to the old
place,' a certain value attaches to the land."
6
Chittenden v. Witbeck, 50 Mich. 401, 15 N.W. 526 (1883).
7
Ibid.
8
Smith v. Gibbs, 44 N.H. 335 at 346 (1862): "By the sale of the good-will of an
established business we understand that the seller parts with and the purchaser acquires
the right to continue that established business, with all the advantages belonging to it as
such." See also, Churton v. Douglas, I Johns. 174, 70 Eng. Rep. 38 5 (18 59); Millspaugh
Laundry v. First National Bank, 120 Iowa 1, 94 N.W. 262 (1903).
9
Munsey v. Butterfield, 133 Mass. 492 (1882).
10
Wentzel v. Barbin, 189 Pa. 502, 42 A. 44 (1899).
11
II VA. L. REV. 392 (1925).
12
In Pulos v. Demarco, [1917] 2 W.W.R. l000 (Alta.), seller of goodwill took a
new lease of the premises which buyer occupied under the existing lease, with the idea
of returning there when the existing lease expired and carrying on a similar business.
The court concluded that such an act was a direct wlicitation of the old customers,
2
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"expectancy of renewal" with which the seller of goodwill should not interfere,
it would also seem that the tenant should have no right to demand from the landlord a renewal on expiration of the lease.18 This would appear to be equally true
where the seller becomes the landlord. If, however, the seller then re-establishes
the same business on the premises, the buyer of the goodwill should be entitled to
relief,1-:l even in those jurisdictions where the vendor is gjven the most freedom.15
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tending to depreciate that which was sold, and ordered the assignment of the new lease
to the buyer, with the lessor's consent; if that were unobtainable, the seller would not be
allowed to carry on the business in the premises.
18 Fine v. Lawless, 139Tenn. 160, 201 S.W. 160 (1918). Crittenden & Cowles Co.
v. Cowles, 66 App. Div. 95 (1901), 72 N.Y.S. 701.
14Lindstrom v. Sauer, (La. App. 1936) 166 S. 636. Fine v. Lawless, 139 Tenn.
160,201 S.W. 160 (1918). Pulos v. Demarco, [1917] 2 W.W.R 1000 (Alta.).
15 Cottrell v. Babcock Printing-Press Mfg. Co., 54 Conn. 122, 6 A. 791 (1886).

